Appendix 96

ITEM	REMARKS
1. Monitoring Information	
a. Assessing risks (risk analysis - for the meeting, for individuals)	
b. Monitoring risks	
c. Identifying sources of information on threats and risks e.g., police, security services, websites, newspapers	
d. Damage prevention and reduction	
i. Crisis management measures	
ii. Responsibilities	
iii. Measures and processes	
iv. Information flow	
v. Partners to co-opt	
2. Risk Management	
a. Strategies	
i. Closer cooperation with police, security services, security staff, fire brigades, first aid/medical services	
ii. Bigger investment in risk management	
iii. Surveillance measures e.g., security staff, video cameras	
iv. Structural security e.g., isolation of meeting by not using ground floor	

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ITEM	REMARKS
3. Operations	
a. Securing of entrances and exits (incl. Basements)	
b. Heightened entrance inspections	
c. Inspection of equipment e.g., laptops, cameras, mobile phones	
d. Delegate ID checks, photo Ids, radar-sensor chips in Ids, barcodes, etc.	
e. Unconditional monitoring of free access zones (no stopping) for emergency services	
f. Emergency call system check	
i. In case of partial failure under pressure	
ii. Does it interfere with speaker communications?	
iii. Need for substitute system?	
g. Evacuation system check	
i. Simple, manageable, efficient, panic-proof design	
ii. In English plus language of host nation	
h. Vital services check	
4. Staff briefing	
a. Risk analysis	
b. Co-opted partners	
c. Emergency drill	
d. Security Enhancement Awareness	
i. Security advisories	
ii. Risk analyses	

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ITEM	REMARKS
5. The Protesters	
a. Universal declaration of Human Rights (UN)	
i. "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association"	
b. Anti-globalisation	
c. Environments	
d. Human rights activists	
e. Animal rights	
f. Anarchists	
g. Other miscellaneous groups	
i. All with a right to be heard!	
6. Actions by Governments	
a. Passing and enacting of new anti-terrorism laws giving police wider powers	
b. Variously interpreted e.g., in Asia political dissidents and social activists tend to be classified as terrorists	
c. Legitimate new mechanisms for police and security services (e.g., trouble-maker databases)	
7. Impact on the Individual Participant	
a. The hassle factor!	
i. Airport delays	
ii. Visas e.g., USA	
iii. Security searches	
iv. Discrimination and profiling	
v. Postponement	
b. Visa exclusion/denial	
c. Surveillance?	
d. Censorship (including self-censorship)	
e. Personal security (travel, on-site)	

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ITEM	REMARKS
8. Impact of Brightened Security on the Organiser	
a. Funding	
b. Marketing	
c. Physical violence	
d. Personal	
e. Damage to Premises	
f. Closure of meeting	
g. Postponement of travel	
h. Damage to reputation	
i. Litigation	
j. Insurance premiums	
9. Security Fundamentals	
a. Host government's responsibility (including budget)	
b. You must not be accountable. Do not try to give advice but know what questions to ask the security authorities (checklist!)	
c. Host security authorities are the decision-makers	
d. Potentially huge budget item	
e. Security Channels	
i. Police (state and/or Federal)	
ii. Security services (internal and/or external)	
iii. Diplomatic (embassies) through liaison services	
10. Registration	
a. As many badges as possible to be issued securely in advance. Issuing to third parties avoided. Signatures obtained for all badges	
b. Where possible badges issued outside the conference venue to ensure they maximum number of bona fide participants have meetings identification before they cross the security perimeter	

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ITEM	REMARKS
11. Non-Participating Personnel	
a. Screening of non-government staff - catering, convention centre staff, technicians, audio-visual company, interpreters, translators, janitors, florists, entertainers	
12. Equipment	
a. X-ray machines	
b. Metal detection gates	
c. Bomb detection mirrors for vehicles	
13. Police Presence	
a. High visibility (image!)	
b. Police escorts	
c. Impact on traffic flow & parking	
d. Catering (budget!) breakfast, lunch, dinner, late night suppers	
14. Special Needs of Police	
a. Liaison officers	
b. Close-in security for VIPs	
c. Bodyguards	
d. Swat teams	
e. Sniffer dogs	
f. Freight checks to premises	
g. Internal security	
h. External security	
i. 24-hour security on premises, on busses, on VIP cars	
15. Security Perimeters	
a. Inner and outer (moveable) perimeters established around meetings sites a few days prior to meetings registration opened earlier)	
b. Admission only to badges participants, verified pre-accredited participants or those with a proven need to be inside the perimeter(e.g., staff, residents, employees)	
c. Occupants of official buses checked prior to boarding. Occupants of cars checked at perimeter	
d. Hotel locations	
e. Need to change traffic flow	

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ITEM	REMARKS
16. Transportation - Cars	
a. Use of cars discouraged	
b. Only cars with special permits admitted	
c. Cars searched at perimeters	
d. Only badged or pre-accredited passengers admitted	
e. Off-site parking and shuttle buses to and from parking lots	
f. Off-site parking for staff	
g. Special arrangements for delivery trucks	
17. Official Bus Transportation	
a. Special buses from hotels with police escorts or police protection	
b. Drivers on two-way radio/cell phones	
c. Police helicopters surveying area to determine open routes	
d. Bus transportation commended early (5:00 a.m.) to ensure participants arrive before demonstrations obstructed routes	
18. Organisational structure	
a. Security Authorities	
i. A coordinated, multi-agency effort	
ii. A separate organisation structure/committee/"task forces"	
b. Committee meetings	
i. Close and regular	
ii. In lead up to meeting	
iii. Can be useful to have PCO on committees	
19. Security Coordination Committee	
a. Representatives from	
i. Client/organisation Secretariat	
ii. Host government secretariat	
iii. Host city secretariat	
iv. Host security authorities	
v. Can be useful to have PCO on the committee	

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ITEM	REMARKS
20. Principle of cooperation	
a. Work with the experts	
b. Share the information	
c. Use the networking opportunity	
21. The Plan	
a. Police meetings; close and regular	
b. Protestors' websites to be monitored	
c. Police security perimeters	
d. Off-site accreditation centres	
e. Special bus transportation (with police escorts and protection) and routes	
f. Special permits for cars (and car searches)	
g. Police security perimeter walls (safety zones)	
h. Special ID badges (holograms)	
i. Intelligence gathering (24-hour security of premises, cars and buses)	
j. Special parking arrangements at all venues	
k. Utilities protection (power, water)	
l. Emergency evacuation scenario e.g., dedicated metro trains	
m. Communication network	
n. Firewalls on internet and LAN (websites and e-mail)	
o. Computer system/internet hackers	
p. Flexibility	
q. Controls on what sensitive information to release on websites	
22. Defusing Strategy	
a. Briefing the neighbourhood	
b. Dialogue with protestors	
c. "Outreach" programs and op. ed articles	

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ITEM	REMARKS	
23. Recommendations for PCOs (Organisers)		
 a. Establish a close working relationship with the police and local authorities and hold regular meetings 		
b. Monitor protestors websites		
c. Establish constructive dialogue with NGO groups		
d. Set-up a good communications network with a back-up plan		
e. Expect all internal communications to be seen by protestors and press		
f. Maintain flexibility and plan for the unexpected		
24. Conclusions		
a. Post- Seattle '99		
b. Post September 11, 2001		
i. Increased event security and visa restrictions		
 ii. Trend towards locating meetings in difficult to access and easy to secure locations E.g., G8 in Rocky Mountains, ADB in Jeju Island, Korea 2004, IADB in Okinawa (Island) Japan 2003 		
c. Meeting the security requirements is extremely demanding and expensive and countries with relaxed entry procedures may find it hard to meet them		
d.Global political instability has rendered many potential conference locations unviable and made potential hosts unwilling to invite organisations		
e. In the light of general instability, hotels in countries with heavy MICE activity imposing demanding booking conditions, sometimes unrealistic		

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